7 - Eléctioons du 24 octobre en Tunisie :
Tunisia: a predictable tale
From Alex Lindsay in Tunis
October 21st, 2004 -- Tunisians will head to the polls on 24 October for presidential and parliamentary elections with a sense of déjà vu. Although all but one of the presidential candidates has changed since the last election in 1999, no one expects an upset at the polls for long-serving President Zine al-Abdin Ben Ali or the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD).
Running against Ben Ali are Mohammed Halouani, a leftist professor who leads the former communist party, al-Tajdid; Mohammed Bouchiha, secretary-general of the left-of-centre Popular Unity Party (PUP); and Mounir Beji, president of the centrist Social Liberal Party (SLP). In September secular lawyer Ahmed Nejib Chebbi also declared his candidacy during a trip to Washington, but this has not been recognized by the Constitutional Council. His pronouncement that Tunisia was in a “president-for-life situation” and was not democratic no doubt hurt his chances of being allowed to take part. He also fell foul of the regulation that candidates muster the support of 30 MPs and have been a leading member of a parliamentary grouping for at least five years.
Ben Ali’s re-election campaign got a boost in mid-September when two opposition parties — the pan-Arabist Union of Democratic Unionists (UDU) and the Social Democratic Movement (SDM) — declared their support for his candidacy. UDU Secretary-General Ahmed Inubli told the state news service TAP that his party was backing Ben Ali in the belief that he would continue “to drive the democratic process and realize the objectives of economic and social development”. The general workers’ union (the UGTT), the national business federation (UTICA) and the national women’s union (UNFT) are also supporting the president, while the local press is, as usual, replete with articles and editorials extolling his achievements.
One party, one president
Despite the veneer of multi-party democracy — six political parties are fielding candidates for the legislature, alongside the four presidential candidates — Tunisia remains in essence a one-party state. Although some opposition parties have been legal since 1981, the RCD (formally the Neo-Destour Party) remains the dominant force, partly because of its historic popularity and the advantages it enjoys as a result of being the ruling party. For its part, the opposition is weakened by internal divisions, severe restrictions on its ability to organize and a lack of attention given to opposition politicians in the local media. Of the Chamber of Deputies’ 182 members, 148 are members of the RCD (it won 92% of the vote in 1999), while the remaining 34 seats are held by opposition parties. Their 20% share of the legislature was not won outright at the polls but rather results from a “positive discrimination” measure introduced in the 1990s. In reality, the measure was an attempt to provide an appearance of democracy rather than help give voice to the opposition.
At the head of the Tunisian political system is Ben Ali, who ascended to power after overthrowing Habib Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in 1987. His promises of greater democratic openness and respect for human rights inspired hope that political liberalization was on the agenda. Constitutional and legal reforms saw to the abolition of the concept of “president-for-life” with the imposition of presidential term limits, and provisions for greater opposition involvement in political life. But Ben Ali moved quickly to crush his main competition, namely the Islamist al-Nahda (Renaissance) Party, and strengthen the state security apparatus.
After the one-horse races of 1989 and 1994, two opposition candidates were allowed to contest the presidential election in 1999. But the lack of true competition was reflected in the vote count: the incumbent took 99%. To help secure Ben Ali’s longer-term political future, constitutional amendments were required. Parliament complied, passing in 2002 a package of apparently democratizing amendments to remove limitations on the length of the president’s tenure (allowing Ben Ali to stand for a fourth term in 2004) and extend the age limit from 70 to 75 (to allow him to stand again in 2009).
Thus the very structure of the Tunisian political system has helped ensure the RCD’s position, with Ben Ali at the helm. As president, he is the dominant force and appoints the prime minister and cabinet, which is largely made up of technocrats entrusted to implement policies formulated by the president and his circle of advisers. Ben Ali also has the right to propose legislation, dismiss parliament and rule by decree during parliamentary recesses. Although the legislature provides an increasing forum for debate on national policy, it is never the source of legislation and almost always provides a rubber stamp (albeit after the odd minor change) to bills presented by the executive. While the legal system is in theory independent, the executive plays a guiding role, particularly in political cases, and the president appoints the judges who sit on the country’s highest court.
Despite the democratic veneer, Tunisian and foreign human rights organizations and NGOs have worked to expose the dark underbelly of Tunisia’s political system. Human Rights Watch says that the country’s jails hold around 500 political prisoners. Most are Islamists convicted after unfair trials on non-violent charges, such as membership of banned political organizations like al-Nahda, which was outlawed in 1991 and labelled a terrorist organization. The regime has also sought to silence Tunisians abroad, and Human Rights Watch noted in July that “Tunisia has imprisoned dozens of its citizens for having participated in legal dissident activities when they were in Europe or North America”.
As well as imprisoning political opponents, the government is accused of continually harassing lawyers who have spoken out against the judiciary’s lack of independence. In 2002 and 2003, Human Rights Watch publicized the authorities’ attempts to crack down on the new Tunisian Centre for an Independent Judiciary (CTIJ) and the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners (AISPP). It has also highlighted the case of the founder of the CTIJ, Mokhtar Yahyaoui, against whom the authorities began a campaign of physical and legal harassment after he became the first sitting judge to speak out about political interference in the legal system.
Economic gains
Yet it must be noted that the RCD’s strength lies not only in dominance of the apparatus of state and its highly efficient and repressive security services, but also in the benefits Ben Ali’s leadership has brought the country over the past 17 years. Although unemployment remains stubbornly high at around 15%, and real incomes have not yet risen to the lowertier OECD country level, recent decades have brought steadily improving socioeconomic conditions.
More than a decade of political stability and consistent macroeconomic policy has allowed Tunisia to shine as the leading economy in North Africa. It is one of only three African countries boasting an investment grade rating. Financial analysts note the country’s continued fiscal consolidation, prudent monetary policy and strong expected growth. Tunisia averaged 4.7% real growth in GDP per annum between 1999 and 2003, even taking into account growth of just 1.7% in 2002. Growth of 5.6% is forecast for 2004.
The government’s focus on human development, education and health has produced social indicators that are above average in North Africa. The country has moved away from agriculture and has done well at attracting foreign investment into the manufacturing and service sectors. Economic diversification has helped the country record sustainable growth and withstand exogenous shocks.
Ratings agencies and the IMF have noted, however, that economic performance and the country’s ability to attract investment are constrained by its highly-centralized political system and the need for further economic liberalization. In addition, there are potential storm clouds over the horizon for the manufacturing sector, the engine of the economy. The sector is bracing itself for the full implementation in 2005 of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), which provides for the complete abolition of trade quotas in the textiles sector. Tunisia’s European Union Association Agreement also requires it to abolish industrial tariff and non-tariff barriers by 2008, in return for greater integration and trade linkages with EU member-states. While the government has helped domestic industry restructure ahead of the implementation of Association Agreement, and is aiming to increase the economy’s competitiveness while creating jobs and raising real wages, some locals see the Association Agreement as benefiting Europe to a much greater extent than Tunisia.
Despite the storm clouds, the consensus among Tunisians at large appears to be that for now at least, stability and prosperity are more important than democracy. When a sideways glance is taken at the economic stagnation of many of the region’s countries, and the political violence that has plagued neighbouring Algeria for more than a decade, many feel the compromise is worth it.
Such a compromise also suits Tunisia’s international allies. In a perfect reflection of the West’s attitude that support for secular regimes in the region is worth almost any cost, Tunis is considered a key ally in the international “war on terror”. Although the US has voiced muted criticism — Secretary of State Colin Powell used Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia’s September visit to Washington as an opportunity to call for continued democratic reform and free, fair and open elections in October — President Bush has made no mention of Tunisia in his speeches on democracy in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, French President Jacques Chirac stunned observers during a December 2003 visit to Tunis when he effectively dismissed the case of hunger-striking dissident lawyer Radia Nasraoui (MEI 715).
With such strong international allies, no peep of protest is expected when the authorities announce yet another stunning victory for Ben Ali and the RCD in the days after the 24 October vote. The real surprise will come when the regime finally opens the political system up to real competition.